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370 IN BE SECURITY FINANCE CO. [49 C.2d 
[So F. No. 19455. In Bank. Nov. 12, 1957.] 
In re SECURITY FINANCE COMPANY (a Corporation), 
in Process of Voluntary Winding Up. 
EARL R. ROUDA, Respondent, V. GEORGE N. CROCKER 
et at, Appellants. 
[1] Corporations-DissolutioD.-At common law a corporation had 
no power to end its existence; the shareholder.- could surrender 
the charter, but actual dissolution depended on acceptance by 
the sovereign. 
[2] ld.-Voluntary Dissolution-Judicial SupervisioD.-The su-
perior court has jurisdiction to supervise the dissolution of a 
corporation by virtue of Corp. Code, § 4607, only if the cor-
poration is "in the process of voluntary winding up," and the 
corporation is in the process of voluntary winding up only if 
a valid election to wind up has been made pursuant to § 4600. 
[3] 1d.-Volunta17 Dissolution-Rights of Shareholders.-Share-
holders representing 50 per cent of the voting power do not 
have an absolute right under Corp. Code, § 4600, to dissolve 
a corporation; they. have no right to dissolve it to defraud . 
other shareholders, to "freeze out" minority shareholders, or 
to sell the assets of the dissolved corporation at an inade-
quate price. 
[4] ld. - Voluntary Dissolution - Election to Dissolve.':'" Under 
Corp. Code, § 4600, the election to dissolve a corporation is the 
election of the corporation, not merely of shareholders repre-
senting 50 per cent of the voting power, though it is through 
their consent that the election is made. 
[5] 1d.-VoluntalT Dissolution-Equitable Limitations.-There is 
nothing sacred in the life of a corporation that transcends the 
interests of its shareholders, but because dissolution falls with 
such finality on those interests, above all corporate powers 
it is subject to equitable limitations. 
[8] 1d.-Volunt&17 Dissolution-Equitable Limitations.-Though 
the preamble or opening sentence of Civ. Code, • 400 [predeces-
sor to Corp. Code, § 4600] to the effect that '!if it is deemed 
advisable and for the benefit of any corporation that it be 
wound up and dissolved it may elect to terminate its business" 
[2] See OaLJur.2d, Corporations, § 445 et seq.; Am.J'ur., Corpora-
tions, §§ 1292, 1293. 
MeX. Dig. Refe~enties: [1] Corporations, 1821; [2-8, 10, 11, 
13-15] Corporations, § 827; [7, 12] Corporations, § 831; [8] Cor-
porations, § 834.5; [9] Corporations, § 832. 
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was eliminated by amendment in 1933, this was not intended to 
raise any implication that the usual equitable obligations as 
to the exercise of good faith by the directors and shareholders 
in the exercise of the statutory power to dissolve were abro-
gated. 
[7] Id.-Voluntary Dissolution-Hearing-Issues.-In a proceed-
ing for voluntary dissolution of a corporation initiated by a 
shareholder owning 50 per cent of the stock, the petitioner's 
good faith was in issue and was passed on by the trial court, 
and the trial court did not accept petitioner's contention that 
bad faith was immaterial, where the question was placed di· 
rectly in issue by the answer, the court repeatedly indicated 
that it would receive evidence of bad faith if it were offered, 
and by making that contention petitioner did not adopt it as 
an exclusive theory of his case where he introduced evidence 
of good faith and stated on at least two occasions that objec-
tions to questions asked by counsel for one of the other share-
holders would be withdrawn if the evidence was being offered 
on the issue of fraud. 
[8] Id.-VoluntaI'1 Dissolution-Appeal-Invited Error.-In a 
proceeding for voluntary dissolution of a corporation initiated 
by a shareholder owning 50 per cent of the stock, if .the trial 
court erred in indicating that some of the evidence was ad· 
mitted on the issue of friction between the parties and not 
on the issue of good faith the error was invited by the other 
shareholders, who objected on the ground that the evidence 
had no relevancy to any possible issue. 
[9] Id.-VoluntaI'1 Dissolution-Evidence-B~d Faith.-The evi-
dence failed to establish that a shareholder owning 50 per cent 
of the stock of a corporation to which he was required to 
devote his entire time acted in bad faith in filing a petition 
for voluntary dissolution where he had for several years been 
attempting to receive a fair return on his investment, where 
the other shareholders refused to allow him an increase in 
salary as his responsibilities grew unless they received cor· 
responding increases although they were required only to 
attend approximately four directors' meetings a year, and 
where they would not buy petitioner's stock, sell theirs to 
him, or consent to a sale of the business unless he promised 
to pay them a large sum as compensation for releasing him 
from his obligation to work for the corporation. 
[10] Id. - VoluntaI'1 Dissolution - Rights of Shareholders. - A 
shareholder representing the requisite voting power of a cor-
poration may pre'tect his investment by dissolution where all 
alternative me-to ods are foreclosed, no advantage is secured 
ovel" other shareholders, and no rights of third parties will be 
adversely affected. 
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[11] lei. - Voluntarr Dissolution - Good Faith. - Consent by a 
shareholder to unanimous consent provisions and restrictions 
on transfer of his stock did not encompass consent to the abuse 
of such provisions by the other shareholders to bene1lt them-
selves at his expense, and good faith on their part as directors 
was as essential as good faith on his part in seeking dissolu-
tion of the corporation. 
[12] Id.-Voluntary Dissolution-Hearing-Exclusion of Evidence. 
-In a proceeding for voluntary dissolution of a corporation 
initiated by a shareholder owning 50 per cent of the stock, the 
exclusion of evidence that petitioner knew that the oorpora-
tion would sder if it were dissolved, on the ground that 
since he had a legal right to dissolve to protect his invest-
ment, injury to the corporation was immaterial, was not preju-
dioial, though it was relevant on the issue of good faith, where 
there was other evidence that petitioner knew that dissolution 
would be detrimental to the corporation and it was clear that 
all parties and the court so understood. 
[18] Id. - Voluntary Dissolution - Rights of Shareholders. - A 
shareholder representing the requisite voting power of a cor-
poration was not precluded by a settlement agreement from 
seeking dissolution of the corporation, though some language 
in the agreement might be so construed, where another sen-
tence therein expressly declared that, notwithstanding any 
provisions therein, any party might take' steps to dissolve 
the corporation purslllUlt to California law. 
[14] Id.-Voluntary Dissolution-Judicial Supervision.-Though 
Civ. Code, § 403 [the predecessor to Corp. Code, § 4607] pro-
vided that the court should take jurisdiction of a proceeding 
for voluntary dissolution of a corporation, whereas Corp. 
Code, § 4607, provides that the court may take jurisdiotion, it 
was unnecessary to decide whether court supervision can be 
invoked when there is no possibility of disputes arising among 
the shareholders during the dissolution, where the oourt could 
reasonably conolude that it was in the best interest of all 
parties to have the oourt supervise the winding up of the 
oorporation, there being evidence that the other shareholders 
threatened to delay dissolution for 10 to 15 years and that they 
would not oonsent to a sale of the assets of the corporation 
unless petitioner paid them $100,000. 
[15] IeI.-VoluntaIT Dissolution-Action of Shareholdera.-Corp. 
Code, § 2201, subd. (e), relating to special notice of a meeting 
of shareholdel'll, and § 2239, requiring approval of all share-
holders in lieu of a,. formal meeting, would apply to a pro-
ceeding for voluntary dissolution of a corporation only if the 
election to dissolve had been by vote rather than by written 
00IlIl8Dt. 
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APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the City 
and County of San Francisco granting a petition for judicial 
supervision and assuming jurisdiction over a corporation in 
proceedings for voluntary dissolution of the corporation. 
Frank T. Deasy, Judge. Affirmed. 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Long & Levit, Malcolm T. 
Dungan and Bert W. Levit for Appellants. 
Young, Rabinowitz & Chouteau, Morris M. Doyle, William 
W. Schwarzer, and McCutcheon, Thomas, Matthew, Griffiths 
& Greene for Respondent. 
TRA YNOR, J .-This appeal is from orders of the superior 
court granting a petition for judicial supervision and assum-
ing jurisdiction under Corporations Code, section 4607, over a 
corporation allegedly in the process of voluntary winding up 
and dissolution pursuant to Corporations Code, section 4600. 
The Security Finance Company, the enterprise now alleged 
to be in the process of winding up, began in 1940 as a partner-
ship engaged in the business of making personal loans and 
buying conditional sales contracts. The partners were Earl 
R. Rouda, and Herbert A. and George N. Crocker, who are 
brothers. Rouda had considerable experience in the personal 
loan business, and agreed to devote his talents and energies to 
the enterprise. The Crockers agreed to contribute $20,000 
in capital and to secure necessary bank credit. 
In 1946 the partners decided to incorporate. They agreed 
that Rouda was to hold 3,000 shares and the Crockers 1,500 
shares each of the common stock of the corporation. The 
Crockers and other shareholders, whose names do not appear 
in the record, hold 11,500 shares of preferred stock. The 
right to vote is vested exclusively with the common stock in 
the absence of default in the payment of dividends to the 
preferred shares. 
The incorporation agreement reaffirmed the principles on 
which the partnership was founded: Rouda agreed to "devote 
his entire and undivided time, attention, effort, business ex-
perience, and knowledge to the interests and conduct of the 
business ... ," and to contribute his "work and labors specifi-
cally to the active management and operation of the business. 
. . ." The Crockers ~reed to procure loans from banks, and 
in their sole discretIon to make available to the corporation 
their credit and financial standing. The agreement required 
) 
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unanimity for all acts of the board of directors and for tbt' 
exercise of powers vested in the voting shareholders, and 
provided generally that, "it is the intention of the partirs 
hereto that the ~ontl'ol of the corporation and of all its acts 
shall be exercised by and with the· unanimous concurrence of 
all of the parties hereto." The agreemt'nt also provided that 
no shareholder could sell all his common stock unless the 
purchaser first agreed that it would become nonvoting stock. 
or agreed to the unanimous consent provisions in the incor-
poration agreement and the other shareholders werE' willing 
to have the transferee substituted for' his transferor as a 
voting shareholder. 
Rouda is the president and general manager of the cor-
poration and chairman of the board of directors. He has 
exclusive control of the day to day business of the corporation. 
Under Rouda's management the corporation has grown and 
prospered, and during the months immediately preceding the 
present litigation profits reached the highest level in the 
corporation's history. 
The parties had their first serious disagreement toward the 
end of 1952. The Crockers filed an action for dissolution 
of the corporation contending that Rouda had failed to devote 
his full time and energies to the business and bad diverted 
to his own use the funds and property of the corporation and 
the services of its employees. Rouda then filed an action for 
declaratory relief contending that the Crockers had breached 
the incorporation agreement by failing to lend their credit to 
the corporation and by commencing the dissolution proceed-
ings. These differences were compromised in March, 1954. In 
the settlement agreement Rouda agreed to pay $15,500 to the 
Crockers and $45,000 to the corporation, secured by a pledge 
of his stock. The parties thereupon released each other from 
all claims arising out of the subjects in dispute. 
Notwithstanding the settlement of the parties' disputes and 
the return of business to a high level of prosperity, Rouda, in 
December, 1954, expressed his wish to withdraw from the 
corporation. Without the consent of the Crockers, he nego. 
tiated for a sale of the business and received six offers from 
interested parties. The Crockers stated that they were com· 
pletely satisfied with the prosperous conditio!} of the business 
and did not wish to sell. They would consent to a sale of the 
business only if Rouda paid th't!m $100,000 to release him 
from what they said' was his contractual obligation to serve 
the corporation indefinitely. According to Rouda's testimony, 
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he then suggested that the Crockers buy his stock for $275,000 
or an amount reached through negotiation, or if they did not 
buy within a certain time, that he would buy their stock 
for the same price. The Crockers were unwilling to buy 
Rouda's stock or to sell him theirs. This dispute culminated 
in an ultimatum from Rouda that if the Crockers did not 
agree to his proposal for a sale of stock or of the business, 
he would dissolve the corporation. 
As security for his promise to make payments under the 
settlement agreement of 1954, Rouda pledged all his stock to 
the Anglo-California Bank. In June, 1955, he redeemed the 
stock with money borrowed from the First Western Bank, and 
then immediately pledged the stock to First Western. He 
promised . First Western that he would repay them with 
proceeds from the sale of the business, or, if the business 
was not sold, that he would dissolve the corporation and pay 
them from his distributive share. In the settlement agreement 
of 1954, Rouda promised to disclose his personal investments 
and business activities to the Crockers, but the Crockers did 
not learn of the second pledge until after this action was 
commenced. 
In July, 1955, Rouda, as holder of 50 per cent of the voting 
stock of Security Finance, executed and filed with the cor· 
poration his consent to voluntary dissolution. He then exe· 
cuted for the corporation and filed with· the Secretary of 
State a certificate of election to wind up and dissolve. In 
August, 1955, he petitioned the superior court for judicial 
supervision of the winding up and dissolution. The petition 
states that the corporation is in the process of voluntary wind· 
ing up and dissolution, and that judicial supervision is neces· I 
gary because of serious differences of opinion between Rouda 
and the Crockers "with respect to conduct of the business 
of Security Finance Company, as well as with respect to a 
proper policy relating to salaries, dividends, financing, and 
sales of assets, as a result of which unanimous consent cannot 
be had." After a hearing on an order to show cause why 
the petition should not be granted, the court granted Rouda's 
petition and issued an order in which it assumed jurisdiction 
over the winding up of the corporation, directed that notice 
be given to shareholders and creditors, and appointed a referee 
to hear and determine any matters that might arise during 
the winding up. The Croekers appeal. 
[1] At common/law a corporation had no power to end its 
existence. The shareholders could surrender the charter, but 
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actual dissolution depended on acceptance by the sovereign. 
Whether or not surrender of the charter of a prosperous cor-
poration could be effected by a majority of the shareholders 
was long a subject of dispute. (See Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 
76 N.H. 351 [S2 A. 1014, 1016-101S, Ann.Cas. 1913A 366, 
L.R.A. 1917A 1174], appeal dismissed, 239 U.S. 627 [36 S.Ct. 
164, 60 L.Ed. 474] ; Warren, VoZ"ntary TraMfer, of Corpo-
rate Und6f'takings, 30 Harv.L.Rev. 335-346; bnt see PeopZe v. 
Ballard, 134 N.Y. 269 [32 N.E. 54,59,17 L.R.A. 7871; For-
rester v. Mining Co., 21 Mont. 544 [55 P. 229, 233, 853].) 
The fact that powers necessary for the att&nment of corpo-
rate objectives were ordinarily vested iii the majority did not 
necessarily mean that the minority should have no say on the 
fundamental issue of corporate life or death. In California, 
as in many other states, general statutory provisions authorize 
voluntary dissolution with the consent of a certain percentage' 
of the shareholders. 
Section 4600 of the Corporations Code provides that, "Any 
corporation may elect to wind up its affairs and voluntarily 
dissolve by the vote or written consent of shareholders or 
members representing 50 percent or more of the voting 
power." Section 4607 provides that, "If a corporation is in 
the process of voluntary winding up, the superior court • • . 
upon the petition of .•• (b) the holders of 5 percent or more 
of the number of its outstanding shares ..• may make orders 
and adjudge as to any and all matters concerning the winding 
up of the affairs of the corporation." Sections 460S to 4619 
provide that the jurisdiction of the court includes the deter-
mination:' of claims against the corporation and the rights of 
the shareholders in the assets, the settlement of directors' 
accounts, the appointment of referees, and other matters neces-
Sary for- the equitable settlement of corporate affairs. 
[2] The court has jurisdiction by virtue of section 4607 
only if the corporation is "in the proCess of voluntary winding 
up," and the corporation is in the process of voluntary wind-
ing up only if a valid election to wind up has been made 
pursuant to section 4600. In the present case, therefore, in 
assuming jurisdiction over the corporation the court neces-
sarily determined that Rouda had validly consented and exer-
cised the oorporate election, and that the corporation W8B in 
the pt'ooeI!III of voluntary winding up and dissolution. 
[8] Sharehold~.~· representing 50 per cent of the voting 
power do not have an absolute right under section 4600 to 
dissolve a corporation. Thus, they have no right to dissolve 
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a corporation to defraud the other shareholders (see Kava· 
naugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting 00., 226 N.Y. 185 [123 N.E. 
148]), to "freeze out" minority shareholders (see Lebold v. 
Inland Steel 00. [7th Cir.], 125 F.2d 369, 372, modified on 
rehearing, 136 F.2d 876, cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675 [62 S.Ct. 
1045. 86 L.Ed. 1045]), or to sell the assets of the dissolved 
corporation at an inadequate price. (See J. B. Lane If 00. v. 
Maple Ootton Mills [4th Cir.] , 226 F; 692, 695-698 [141 C.C.A. 
448], modified on rehearing, 232 F. 421 [146 C.C.A. 415].) 
[4] Under section 4600 the election to dissolve is the election 
of the corporation, not merely of shareholders representing 
50 per cent of the voting power, although it is through their 
consent that the election is made. [5] There is nothing 
sacred in the life of a corporation that transcends the interests 
of its shareholders, but because dissolution falls with such 
finality on those interests, above all corporate powers it is 
subject to equitable limitations. (See Hornstein, Voluntary 
Dissotution--A New Development tn Intracorporate Abuse. 
51 Yale L. J. 64, 65.69.) [6] "The preamble or opening sen· 
tence of section 400, Civil Code [predecessor to section 4600], 
to the etIect that 'if it is deemed advisable and for the benefit 
of any corporation that it be wound up and dissolved it may 
elect to terminate its business,' was eliminated by amendment 
in 1933. This was not intended, however, to raise any impli. 
cation that the usual equitable obligations as to the. exercise 
of good faith by the directors and shareholders in the exercise 
of the statutory power to dissolve were abrogated." (Bal. 
lantine and Sterling, California Corporation Laws 446 (1949 
ed.).) The controlling issue, therefore, is whether Rouda's 
decision to dissolve the corporation was made in· good faith. 
The Crockers contend that the order must be reversed on 
the ground that the trial court never passed on this issue. 
They contend that in the trial court Rouda proceeded on the 
theory that he had an absolute right to dissolution, that the 
trial court agreed with this theory, and that Rouda may not 
now change his theory of the case by asserting that the record 
contains evidence of good faith, which, they insist, they had 
no opportunity to controvert. There is no merit in these 
contentions. [7] The issue of Rouda's good or bad faith 
in seeking dissolution was placed directly in issue by the 
Crockers' answers to Rouda's petition, and the trial court 
repeatedly indica~ that it would receive evidence of bad 
faith if it were offered. Accordingly, it is clear that the trial 
court did not accept Rouda's contention that bad faith was 
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immaterial, alld by making that contention Rouda did not 
adopt it as all exclusive theory of his case. Thus, he intro-
duced evidence of good faith and stated on at least two 
occasions that objections to questions asked by counsel for 
one of the Crockers would be withdrawn if the evidence was 
being offered on the issue of fraud. Facts bearing on Rouda's 
motivation were carefully elicited on both direct and cross-
examination. [8] Although the record is not clear, it may be 
true that as to some of this evidence the trial court indicated 
that it was admitted on the issue of frictioll between the parties 
and not on the issue of good faith. If the trial court erred 
in this respect, however, the error was invited by the Crockers 
who objected on the ground that the evidence had no relevancy 
whatever to any possible issue in the case. 
[9] With respect to the issue of good faith there is evi-
dence of the following facts. For several years before this 
action, Rouda had been attempting to receive a fair return 
on his investment. He sought an increase in salary or in 
dividends. Since the Crockers would not agree to either, he 
sought to sell his stock to them, to buy their stock, or to sell 
the assets of the corporation. The Crockers refused to allow 
Rouda an increase in salary as his responsibilities grew unless 
they received corresponding increases although they were 
required only to attend approximately four directors' meet-
ings a year. For attending these meetings, they each received 
$500 per month. Rouda, however, was required to devote all 
his time to the business and received only $1,456 per month. 
The Crockers were both in high tax brackets and did not wish 
to increase dividends. They would not buy Rouda's stock, 
sell theirs to him, or consent to a sale of the business unless I 
Rouda promised to pay them $100,000 as compensation for 
releasing him from his obligation to work for the corporation. 
Because of the restrictions placed on a transfer of the stock, 
Rouda was not able to sell his stock to outsiders at a price that 
fairly represented his investment in the corporation. Thus his 
purpose in dissolving the corporation was to protect his invest-
ment. [10] He did not act in bad faith in doing so, for a 
shareholder representing the requisite voting power may pro-
tect his investment by dissolution (ct., In re Evening Journal 
Ass'n., 15 N.J. Super 58 [83 A.2d 38, 41]) when, as in this 
case, all alternative methods are foreclosed, no advantage is 
secured over other shareholders, and no rights of third parties 
will be adversely atFected. (See Lattin, Equitable Limitations 
on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority Stock-
hoZckrs, 30 Mich.L.Rev. 645, 665.) 
) 
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[11] The Crockers eon tend that since Rouda consented to 
the adoption of the unanimous consent provisions and the 
restrictions on transfer of his stock, he is in. no position to 
claim that he cannot realize his investment by way of divi-
oends, salary, sale of assets, or saie of his shares and must 
t.herefore dissolve the corporation to realize that investment. 
His consent to the unanimous consent provisions, however, did 
not encompass consent to the abuse of these provisions by the 
Crockers to benefit themselves at Rouda's expense. Good 
faith on their part as directors was as essential as good faith 
on Rouda's part in seeking dissolution. 
[12] The Crockers also object to the ruling of the trial 
court excluding evidence that Rouda knew that the corpora-
tion would suffer if it were dissolved. The court rejected the 
offer of proof on the ground that if Rouda had a legal right 
to dissolve, injury to the corporation was immaterial. Rouda 
p..stablished that dissolution was necessary to protect his in-
vestment and that it will give him no unfair advantage, for 
it will affect Rouda and the Crockers equally. Since, as noted 
above, there is nothing sacred in the life of a corporation that 
transcends the interests of the shareholders, the court properly 
concluded that if Rouda had a right to dissolve the corpor-
ation, injury to it was immaterial. Although it is true that 
Rouda's knowledge that dissolution would injure the cor-
poration was relevant to the issue of his good faith and in tum 
to the issue of his right to dissolve, no prejudice appears from 
the trial court's exclusion of this evidence on the issue of 
good faith. Thus, there was other evidence in the record 
that Rouda knew that dissoluion would be detrimental to the 
corporation and it is clear that all of the parties and the 
court so understood. 
[13] The Crockers contend that in paragraph 13- of the 
settlement agreement Ronda waived any right to dissolve that 
." 13. Futur, dissolution. If at any time hereafter the parties become 
unable to reach unanimous consent with respect to the operations of 
the SECUlU1'Y corporations, this shall entitle RoUDA or either of the 
CaoCKERS, if so advised, to require a dissolution or winding up of the 
affairs of said corporation. It is agreed that notwithstanding any provi, 
sion contained in the incorporation agreement, or in the articles or 
by-lawB of the SlWURI1'Y corporations, or in this agreement, nothing 
herein is intended to prevent anyone or more of the parties hereto from 
taking such steps as he or they may be advised, in their o~ diae.retion 
to accomplish a dissolutioll'or winding up of the affairs of the SBCUIU'IY 
corporations pursuant t6' the provisions of California law, at any time 
hereafter. Proceedings looking toward di88olution or winding up of said 
corporations shall not be deemed to be a breach or violation of any agree-
ment between the parties whatsoever •••• " 
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he might have had under section 4600. They urge that since 
the parties failed to reach unanimous consent only as to 
dividends and salaries, but not with respect to the operation 
of the business, the first sentence of paragraph 13 precludes 
dissolution. The next sentence, however, expressly declares 
that notwithstanding any provisions in the settlement agree· 
ment any party may take steps to dissolve the corporation pur-
suant to California law. Rouda's steps to dissolve were taken 
pursuant to California law. 
The Croekers also contend that even if Ronda has a right 
to dissolve the corporation, no showing was made that would 
give the court jurisdiction under section 4607 to supervise the 
dissolution. They state that no conflict was shown that pre-
vents the operation of the business and that Rouda is no longer 
seeking an increase in salary or dividends. They state that 
Rouda has not shown that conflict will arise during the 
dissolution of the corporation. They claim that court super-
vision will put them to needless expense and will result in 
unnecessary crowding of the court calendar. 
[14] Under section 403 of the Civil Code, the predecessor 
section to section 4607, it was held that if the shareholder has 
properly instituted dissolution, he is entitled to court super-
vision as a matter of right. (In,.e San Joaquin L. ct p. Co,.p., 
52 CaLApp.2d 814, 824-825 [127 P.2d 29].) Although section 
403 provided that the court shall take jurisdiction, whereas 
section 4607 provides that the court may take jurisdiction, the 
court in In ,.e MayeUen Apa,.tments, Inc., 134 Cal.App.2d 
298, 303-308 [285 P.2d 943] declared that section 4607 was 
drafted to reenact section 403 and that the shareholder was 
entitled to judicial supervision as a matter of right. (See also 
Stubbs v. Jones, 121 Cal.App.2d 218 [263 P.2d 100].) It is 
unnecessary to decide whether court supervision can be in-
voked when there is no possibility of disputes arising among 
the shareholders during the dissolution, for the trial court in 
the present case could reasonably conclude that it was in the 
best interest of all the parties to have the court supervise the 
winding up of the corporation. The court, after a four-day 
hearing, decided that it should assume jurisdiction, and the 
evidence supports this conclusion. Even though Rouda seeks 
no increase in salary or dividends during dissolution, there was 
evidence that the Crockers threatened to delay dissolution for 
10 to 15 years and,tJiat they would not consent to a sale of the 
assets of the corporation unless Rouda paid them $100.000. 
Furthermore, the past history of disputes between the parties, 
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indicates that it was unlikely that they would agree on a course 
of action during dissolution that would be in their common 
interest. 
[15] Finally, the Crockers contend that the corporation is 
not "in the process of voluntary winding up" because there 
was no special notice of a meeting of shareholders (see Corp. 
Code, § 2201, subd. (e) and all the shareholders did not 
approve the dissolution in lieu of a special meeting. (See 
Corp. Code, § 2239.) Section 4600 provides for a vote or 
written consent. Sections 2201, subdivision (e), and 2239 would 
apply only if the election to dissolve had been by vote rather 
than by written consent. 
The orders are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December 
11, 1957. 
